Trusts by Bensing, Robert C.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 3
1961
Trusts
Robert C. Bensing
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Robert C. Bensing, Trusts, 12 W. Res. L. Rev. 581 (1961)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol12/iss3/29
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1960
three prime objections to its validity: (1) it is an unauthorized exercise
of police power in a matter totally unrelated to public safety, morals or
general welfare and an unlawful restraint upon the disposition o prop-
erty; (2) that the statute is in effect a price fixing act rather than a
protection for good-will and trade-marks; and (3) it is an unlawful
delegation of legislative power.
MAURICE S. CULP
TRUSTS
DISCRETIONARY TRUST
In Culver v. Culver' the settlor-husband established a trust with a
bank as trustee, under the terms of which he was to be paid the net in-
come for life. The trust agreement also provided that:
In addition to such income, the trustee is authorized, in its absolute
and uncontrolled discretion, to pay to or for the benefit of the Grantor
during his lifetime, parts of the principal of this trust, from time to time
in the event of an emergency affecting him, his wife or children.2
As a result of a divorce action, the husband was ordered to make
support payments. Upon becoming in arrears with respect to such pay-
ments, an order was obtained against the trustee requiring the latter to
pay all income from the trust to satisfy the arrearages. The income hav-
ing been exhausted, the wife brought the present action, seeking pay-
ment from the corpus of the trust. In reversing the lower court, which
had ordered the trustee to pay from the corpus of the trust funds, the
court of appeals found that the trustee had discretion to determine whether
an emergency existed and discretion to determine how much money
should be paid out of principal to alleviate the emergency, and that the
trustee, in electing not to pay under such circumstances, had not abused
its discretion.
The writer has been unable to find any other American case precisely
on point. The weight of text and case authority is that where a person
creates a discretionary trust for his own benefit, his creditors can reach
the maximum amount which the trustee under the terms of the trust
could pay to him or apply for his benefit.3 These authorities do not,
1. 169 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
2. Id. at 488.
3. See cases cited in ScoTr, TRusTs § 156.2 (2d ed. 1956).
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however, shed light upon the problem presented when, as in the Culver
case, the discretion to pay something or nothing is conditioned upon the
trustee's decision whether an emergency exists. Quaere, in light of the
general rule set forth above, if the Culver trustee once determined that
an emergency existed, should the wife then be able to compel the trustee
to pay the principal to her?
TESTAMENTARY TRUSTEE ALSO REMAINDERMAN -
No CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The fact that the testamentary trustee was also a remainderman was
held, in In re Carter's Estate,' not to create such conflict of interest as
would preclude the trustee from serving, since under terms of the trust
the trustee was to pay the entire income, after payment of expenses, to
the life beneficiary and therefore possessed no discretionary powers which
could be exercised adversely to the interests of the life beneficiary.
TRUSTEE - DISLOYALTY AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST
Manchester v. Cleveland Trust Company5 was an action for the re-
moval of a trustee on the grounds of disloyalty and conflict of interest.
The Cleveland Trust Company was trustee of two trusts whose principal
assets consisted of stock of the Austin Company. The Austin Company
was a depositor and potential borrower from the trustee. Mr. Bryant,
chairman of the board of directors of the Austin Company, who wished to
acquire for the employees of the Austin Company all of its outstanding
stock, and had ardently pursued this objective, was also one of twenty-
five directors of the trustee bank. On denying the request of the life
beneficiaries that the trustee be removed, the court stated:
Although we do not find disloyalty to the trust to be established,
we do find such a conflict of interest to exist which, with respect to the
trust-held Austin Company stock, requires the intervention of a court
of equity.
It is therefore the order of this court that, before any Austin Com-
pany stock held by the Austin trust is sold, the trustee shall first secure
an order of the proper court for permission to consummate such sale.8
The decision was written by Judge Oscar Hunsicker, who, this author
believes, has few equals as an opinion writer.
ROBERT C. BENSING
4. 168 N.E.2d 555 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
5. 168 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960). See also discussion in Corporations section, p.
478 supra.
6. Id. at 753.
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